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Notes
AMICUS CURIAE PARTICIPATION-AT THE
COURTS DISCRETION
I. INTRODUCrION
In 1736, an amicus curiae was permitted to stray from the obliga-
tion existing between the parties to a law suit and defend the interests
of one not a party to that suit.' Since that date, a substantial conflict
over the scope of the amicus curiae's role has arisen and caused dissen-
sion among the courts. Theoretically, friendly intervention for the pur-
pose of reminding the court of some legal matter which has escaped its
notice and concerning which it is doubtful is the raison dcetre of the
amicus. 2 Some courts have failed to adequately use the amicus, for
they have refused to advance his role beyond the theoretical and in-
creasingly impractical idea that he is one without an interest in the
litigation, a mere bystander whose sole mission is to aid the court and
to act for the sole benefit of the court.3 Some jurists have become so
linguistically resigned to the "amicus curiae" label4 that they have
even recommended, "The court's attention should be drawn to obvious
error or facts that the parties have failed to present due to ineptitude
or self-interest. In so doing, the amicus may prove a true friend of the
court."5 If this stringent attitude is unwaveringly followed, the role of
the amicus will quite likely be jeopardized by disuse in the courts.
At the other end of the spectrum, however, some courts have sought
1 Coxe v. Phillips, 95 Eng. Rep. 152 (K.B. 1786).2 BLACK, LAW DIcnONARY 107 (4th ed. 1957).
3 Burger v. Burger, 298 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. 1957).
4 See Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 191 F. Supp. 871, 877 (E.D. La.
1961), where the court stated as follows:
[O]rdinarily an amicus curiae merely tenders a brief advising the court
on the law applicable to the case. But . . . the United States is no
ordinary amicus. Whether "amicus curiae" is the proper title is a quibble
over labels. However, we think it singularly appropriate here since the
role of the United States in this proceeding is more truly that of a friend
of the court than is often the case with so-called "amici," who are rather
friends of one party or the other.
Compare generally, Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Ad-
vocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694, 705 (1963).
5 Covey, Amicus Curiae: Friend of the Court, 9 DEPAuL L. REv. 30, 37
(1959-60).
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to rejuvenate the role of the amicus by allowing him to represent the
public interest,6 "to contribute anything to the court by his participa-
tion in the cause,"7 and to have "the right to be heard... within the
court's discretion."8 (Emphasis added.) In line with this trend, many
jurists have cogently noted that "the institution of the amicus curiae
brief has moved from neutrality to partisanship, from friendship to
advocacy,"" and they have even recommended that an amicus should
be allowed in court not only when there is evidence of some weakness
in the legal talent of a principal party,10 but also when the interest of
the amicus is very sharply differentiated from that of the litigant.",
The significance of the controversy over the scope of the amicus
curiae's role, then, is that while both sides, at least conceptually, feel
that the amicus should be a friend of the court, they differ as to the
manner in which he should display his friendship. Although both sides
accept the proposition that an amicus's privilege to participate in liti-
gation is a matter of favor, not right, and thus falls within the discre-
tion of the court,12 the first side seeks to restrict the court's exercise
of discretion while the second side hastens to liberalize it.' 3 Since the
first group is rapidly losing influence, this discussion is confined to the
second view.
Within the group which is concerned with allowing greater partici-
pation of the amicus, there is a cleavage between the federal and state
courts. Many of the federal courts, while approving amicus participa-
tion as a valuable part of our court system, have been somewhat chary
in making drastic changes in their amicus procedures; but many state
courts have taken large strides in allowing greater participation by the
amicus. This Note compares the trend toward greater amicus participa-
tion on the federal level with that on the state, interprets this trend,
and analyzes the criteria that have been adopted by the federal and
state courts when they determine whether to allow amicus participa-
tion. Finally, it attempts to indicate the meaning of the trend as to
future litigation on the federal and state levels. In treating these prob-
lems, the discussion is confined to voluntary amicus participation 4 in
0 Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1958).
7 Keating v. Florida, 157 So. 2d 567, 569 (Fla. 1968).8 Olhauser v. Branaugh, 101 N.W.2d 827, 829 (S.D. 1960).
9 Krislov, supra note 4, at 704.
10 See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 888 U.S. 208 (1948).
11 Krislov, supra note 4, at 711.
124 Am. JuR. 2d Amicus Curiae § 2 (1962).
13 See generally, Krislov, supra note 4, at 705.
14 A party acquires the privilege of entering court as an amicus curiae either
by invitation of the court or by grant of a counsel's application. 4 Am. Jutn. 2d
Amicus Curiae § 2 (1962).
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appellate courts,15 and is as concerned with criminal litigation as with
civil.16
II. Tim RuLEs Oi THE SuPRrm CoURT
The Supreme Court has always been quite concerned with amicus
participation in areas ranging from racial minority interests17 to liquor
interests;' 8 but the Court has not applied its discretion consistently.
In 1952, two justices expressed their dissatisfaction with Rule 27 of
the Rules of the Supreme Court.' 9 In On Lee v. United States,20 Mr.
Justice Frankfurter submitted a memorandum which, in part, stated as
follows:
The rule governing the filing of amici briefs clearly implies that such
briefs should be allowed to come before the Court not merely on the
Court's exercise of judgment in each case. On the contrary, it presup-
poses that the Court may have the aid of such briefs if the parties con-
sent. ... Mr. Justice Black concurs in the foregoing views, but desires to
state that he is of the opinion that the Court's rule regarding the filing
of briefs amicus curiae should be liberalized. 21
As a result of such virulent attacks, by 1954 the Rules of the Supreme
Court were amended so that rule 42 replaced rule 27 with respect to
the amicus curiae, but the amendment made such microscopic
changes2 2 in the amicus section that the total effect of the 1949 rule
15 An amicus curiae may intervene on the trial as well as the appellate level.
See 4 Am. Jur. 2d Amicus Curiae § 2 (1962).
16 But see, City of Columbus v. Tullos, 204 N.E.2d 67, 68 (Ohio 1964), where
the court stated as follows:
Examination of text materials and cases suggests that the amicus
curiae appears most generally in civil processes and trials. The appearance
of such in criminal matters is extremely rare and it seems appropriate to
observe that the very rarity of its occurrence urges the gross impropriety
of such an action.
17 See Guinn & Beal v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
18 See Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146
(1919).
19 U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 27(9) (1949) provided:
A brief of an amicus curiae may be filed . . . when accompanied by
written consent of all parties to the case . except that consent ...
need not be had when the brief is presented by the United States or an
officer or agency thereof and sponsored by the Solicitor General, or by
a State or a political subdivision thereof. Such brief must bear the name
of a member of the bar of this court.
20 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
21 Id. at 924.22 The 1954 rule substantially retained rule 27 and has indicated that consent
of the parties is almost mandatory: "Such motions are not favored." Where the
parties do not consent, the rule is vague and uninformative. See also, note 2.3
infra.
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was unchanged.23 In point of fact, this amendment evoked the follow-
ing dissent from Mr. Justice Black:
Finally, I have never favored the almost insuperable obstacles our
rules put in the way of briefs sought to be filed by persons other than the
actual litigants. Most of the cases before this Court involve matters that
affect far more people than the immediate record parties. I think the
public interest and judicial administration would be better served by re-
ladng rather than tightening the rule against amicus curiae briefs.
24
In criticizing the 1954 rule, Black was assuredly upset by its apparent
vagueness and its dismal failure to prescribe sound criteria to assist
the Court in its discretionary acceptance or denial of an amicus
applicant.
Rule 42 prescribes essentially two requirements to guide the Court
23 Compare the following with the passages quoted in note 19 supra. U.S.
Sup. CT. R. 42 (1954) provides:
1. A brief of an amicus curiae prior to consideration of the jurisdic-
tional statement or of the petition for writ of certiorari, ified with the
consent of the parties, or a motion for leave to file when consent is re-
fused, may be filed only if submitted a reasonable time prior to the
consideration of the jurisdictional statement or of the petition for writ
of certiorari. Such motions are not favored. Distribution to the Court
under the applicable rules of the jurisdictional statement or of the
petition for writ of certiorari, and its consideration thereof, will not be
delayed pending the receipt of such brief or the filing of such motion.
2. A brief of an amicus curiae in cases before the Court on the merits
may be filed only after order of the Court or when accompanied by
written consent of all parties to the case and presented within the time
allowed for the filing of the brief of the party supported.
3. When consent to the filing of a brief of an amicus curiae is refused
by a party to the case, a motion for leave to file may timely be presented
to the Court. It shall concisely state the nature of the applicant's in-
terest, set forth facts or questions of law that have not been, or reasons
for believing that they will not adequately be, presented by the parties,
and their relevancy to the disposition of the case; and it shall in no event
exceed five printed pages in length. A party served with such motion
may reasonably file an objection concisely stating the reasons for with-
holding consent.
4. Consent to the filing of a brief of an amicus curiae need not be
had wvhen the brief is presented for the United States sponsored by the
Solicitor General; for any agency of the United States authorized by law
to appear in its own behalf, sponsored by its appropriate legal repre-
sentative; for a State, Territory, or Commonwealth sponsored by its At-
torney General; or for a political subdivision of a State, Territory or Com-
monwealth sponsored by the authorized lav officer thereof.
5. All briefs, motions and responses filed under this Rule shall be print-
cd; shall comply with the applicable provisions of Rules 35, 39, and 40
(except that it shall be sufficient to set forth the interest of the amicus
curiae, the argument, the summary of argument if required by Rule
40(1)(f), and the conclusion; and shall be accompanied by proof of
service as required by Rule 33).
24 Order Adopting Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States,
346 U.S. 945, 947 (1954).
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in its discretion. First, the applicant must "concisely state the nature
of [his] . . . interest." Secondly, he must "set forth facts or questions
of law that have not been, or reasons for believing that they will not
adequately be, presented by the parties, and their relevancy to the dis-
position of the case... ." Although Black was unhappy with the appar-
ent vagueness of the rule, it is this vagueness perhaps which has al-
lowed the Court to effectively keep out those propaganda briefs that
amici once sought to railroad through the Court.2 5 More importantly,
the Court has given itself sufficient latitude to permit the American
Civil Liberties Union to intervene in Mapp v. Ohio26 with a brief
which urged the overruling of Wolf v. Colorado.27 In Miranda v.
Arizona, the Court even used great portions of the amicus's argument
in its opinion.28 Obviously, the "nature of the interest," "inadequate
presentation," and the "relevancy to the disposition of the case" guide-
lines are nebulous and uninformative, and they indicate that the
Supreme Court is going to determine within its broad discretion,
rather than within a set of strict procedural rules, whether to allow
an amicus to participate. Rule 42 on its face, however, is a feeble
model for other courts, for its tenuous guidelines have so diluted the
amicus's privilege of getting into court that his success might well rest
upon the whims, rather than the discretion, of the lower courts. While
the Rules of the Supreme Court are in no way binding upon other
courts, they are ordinarily a model throughout the country. Despite its
uninformative nature, rule 42 has enjoyed a great deal of influence on
federal and state courts which, in following, interpreting and re-
defining its vague guidelines, have given various aspects of the rule
new meaning.
III. Tim INFLUENCE OF RuLE 42
A. The Nature of the Amicus Interest
As rule 42 indicates, the amicus applicant must first concisely state
the nature of his interest. This requirement has engendered various
interpretations throughout various jurisdictions. One federal court has
stated that the amicus applicant must have a direct interest in the
res of the suit.29 But this statement was made prior to rule 42. In the
25See Craig v. Harney, Sheriff, 831 U.S. 367, 397 (1947); Gironard v.
United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
26367 U.S. 643 (1961).
27338 U.S. 25 (1949).
28884 U.S. 436 (1966). See geenrally, MEmuAmE, FRoM EsCOBEDO TO MI-
RANDA: THE ANATOMY OF A SUPREME COURT DECISION (1966).2 9 Pure Oil Co. v. Ross, 170 F.2d 651, 652 (7th Cir. 1948).
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Matter of Oskar Tiedemann and Company, however, a federal court
found that the tanker industry did not have standing on the ground
that the decision would have "a far-reaching, adverse effect upon the
Tanker indsutry [sic]," 30 and was not allowed to intervene amici
curiae. Despite the fact that the effect of the decision might have
proved "far-reaching" and "adverse" to the entire tanker industry, the
industry's interest was not sufficient to allow any kind of entry into
court. This very questionable decision demonstrates wanton abuse of
discretion on the federal level.
While the federal courts have indicated a rather strict construction
of the amicus's interest, some state courts, at the other end of the
spectrum, have forewarned that they are willing to relax such an
interpretation. In New Jersey, for example, the application to appear
as an amicus curiae was denied because "the petitioner's attitude to-
ward the litigation [was] . ..patently partisan .. ."31 (Emphasis
added.) The Supreme Court of Michigan indicated a similarly liberal
attitude toward the amicus curiae even though the applicant was
denied the privilege to come in as an amicus in this particular case,
apparently on the grounds that he was too partisan to be anything
other than an intervenor. The court said, "In cases involving questions
of important public interest, leave is generally granted to file a brief as
amicus curiae .... ,"32 (Emphasis added.) The "patently partisan" and
"important public interest" tests, however, are hardly the most liberal.
In Pennsylvania, for example, there is every indication that
Any one interested in the questions involved in an appeal, though not a
party to it, may, before the time fixed for argument and without applying
for leave so to do, serve upon appellant and appellee a brief in regard
to those questions, and file thirty (30) copies thereof with the prothono-
tary for distribution as provided in Rule 66.33
This "any one interested" test (as compared with the phraseology in
the Rules of the Supreme Court: "concisely state the nature of the
interest" requirement) fairly clearly indicates that the trend in Pen-
nsylvania is toward a very liberal interpretation of the "nature of the
interest" requirement. Finally, in Kentucky, an amicus brief, within
the knowledge of Judge Clay,34 has never been denied regardless of the
30183 F. Supp. 129, 131 (D. Del. 1960).
31 Casey v. Male, 63 N.J. Super. 255, 164 A.2d 374, 377 (1960).32 Grand Rapids v. Consumers' Power Co., 216 Mich. 409, 185 N.W. 852,
854 (1921).33 PA. Sup. CT. R. 65.34 This information was provided by Judge Watson Clay, Commissioner of
the Kentucky Court of Appeals, through an interview in his office on January 17,




insubstantial nature of the interest. The liberal attitude of the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals surpasses even that of the Pennsylvania Court.
B. Inadequate Presentation of Questions of Law and Their Relevancy
That clause of rule 42 which requires the applicant to "set forth
facts or questions of law that have not been, or reasons for believing
that they will not adequately be, presented by the parties, and their
relevancy to the disposition of the case" is not to be construed as
meaning that the Supreme Court condones an advancement beyond the
issues as presented by the interested parties. In fact, the generally
accepted rule is that the amicus curiae must take the case as he finds
it and cannot inject new issues.35 In most federal courts, then, the
"inadequate presentation" and "relevancy" requirements are tests that
the applicant must meet within the framework of the general rule. In
general, federal courts have allowed exceptions only when the appli-
cant's material has been extremely compelling, necessary and reflec-
tive of widespread interest.36 In Faubus v. United States, for example,
the Attorney General and a United States Attorney were allowed to
intervene as amici because "they were acting under the authority and
direction of the court to take such action as was necessary to prevent
its orders and judgments from being frustrated and to represent the
public interest in the due administration of justice."37 But this was a
case of great public interest, namely, a civil rights problem.
In some state courts the public interest does not have to be great
for the amicus to come in and raise points outside the immediate issues.
This is to say, some state courts might well interpret phraseology simi-
lar to that of the "inadequate presentation" and "relevancy" require-
ments to mean that the amicus can go outside the general rule when-
ever he meets either one of these requirements regardless of the
gravity of the public interest. In point of fact, the Supreme Court of
South Dakota in Ohlhauser v. Branaugh indicated such an attitude to-
ward the general rule: "It [amicus curiae] ordinarily implies the
friendly intervention of counsel to call the court's attention to a legal
matter which has escaped or might escape the court's consideration."38
In this case, involving the contest of a will, the court has represented
itself as being in agreement with the very liberal belief that the amicus
may raise any issue that the court could have raised of its own
accord.
Illinois, more than any other jurisdiction, indicates that there is a
growing trend in the state courts to permit the amicus to go outside
354 Am Jun. 2d Amicus Curiae § 8 (1962).
36 Comment, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 469, 472 (1960).
37 254 F.2d 797, 805 (8th Cir. 1958).
38 101 N.W.2d 827, 829 (S.D. 1960).
[Vol. 55,
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the issues of the case whenever he can meet such requirements as the
"inadequate presentation" or the "relevancy to the disposition of the
case" tests. In Froehler v. North Am. Life Ins. Co. of Chicago, for
example, the court mapped out the following criteria for allowing an
amicus into court:
Intervention by counsel as a friend of the court is only justified when the
intervenor can show to the court that, to protect it in the consideration of
the case, such aid seems necessary or advisable .... Further, no such mo-
tion, except in unusual cases, will be allowed unless it be shown that the
parties to the litigation have overlooked or insufficiently briefed points
and authorities essential to a proper consideration of the cause.39
It should be noted that the Illinois court has in no way indicated that
the amicus must stay within the framework of the interested parties'
issues. In placing emphasis upon those "points ... essential to a proper
consideration of the cause," the Illinois court has expressed an inter-
est in getting the amicus into court even at the expense of additional
issues, rather than in keeping the amicus out of court. As early as
1948, two jurists pointed out that it was difficult to reconcile such an
affirmative precept with the negative rule that the amicus must take
the case as he finds it. They went on to point out a number of devia-
tions from the negative rule and suggestions for further departures.
Uppermost in their thinking were such considerations as public in-
terest, economic interest in the question in issue or in a like case, and
inadequacy of presentation. In such situations they submitted that the
discretion of the court should be generous.40
IV. THE EX=ENT OF T=E Tim
In looking back over the influence of rule 42 on the federal and many
of the state courts, one can readily understand why Mr. Justice Black
was unhappy with the rule: it failed to encourage the Court to treat
the amicus liberally, and it failed to establish a sound rule for lower
courts to adopt. In interpreting the broad guidelines of the Supreme
Court, the federal courts have become little more lenient than the
Supreme Court while such state courts as the Illinois Supreme Court
have eagerly sought to encourage amicus participation under the same
guidelines. Although the Supreme Court has reason to limit amicus
participation, there seems to be no justification for other federal and
state courts to do so. One writer has completely misunderstood the
contemporary benefit of amicus participation in the following exhorta-
tion: "It is hoped that by a more liberal application of admission re-
393 74 Ill. 17, 27 N.E. 833, 838 (1940).40 Beckwith and Sobernheim, Amicus Curiae-Minister of Justice, 17 Foan-
mA. L. REv. 38, 56, 61, 62 (1948).
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quirements in the Supreme Court of the United States, and by a more
stringent one in the Supreme Court of Illinois, the amicus curiae will
become once again truly a friend of the court."4' This is the advice of
an incurable legal Pollyanna. By the time counsel has made his way to
the Supreme Court of the United States, he should be able to brief the
Court on all pertinent issues and thereby render it unnecessary for
that Court to allow propaganda briefs that offer "arguments that might
anger the Justices, doctrines that have not yet been found legally
acceptable, and emotive presentations that have little legal standing.f4
Such arguments, on the other hand, might prove quite beneficial to
other federal and state courts which require all the assistance they can
get to render a fair decision. The Illinois Supreme Court has accom-
plished too much in its development of the amicus curiae role to
thwart a beneficial trend. Hopefully, the federal courts will hurriedly
get in step.
Such jurisdictions as Illinois and Pennsylvania have removed the
emphasis from the amicus applicant's precise interest in the case and
have transferred the emphasis to a consideration of the completeness
and effectiveness of the information before the court. Such a transfer
of emphasis has dictated to the courts that they, in their discretion,
should allow every amicus to come forward who can make any contri-
bution "essential to a proper consideration of the cause." In their
discretion, the courts should never place great weight on the interest
of the amicus or adherence to the issues of the litigants if the amicus
can advance the ends of justice-even at the expense of extra admini-
stration. Illinois and Pennsylvania have sought to give positive guide-
lines to their courts, and Florida has indicated a penchant to eventually
follow their examples. In allowing an amicus curiae brief in a liquor
licensee's proceeding against the Director of the State Beverage
Department, for example, the Supreme Court of Florida made the
following statement:
[A]micus is not confined solely to arguing the parties' theories in support
of a particular issue. To confine amicus curiae to arguing a parties'
theories regarding a particular issue is to place him in a position of par-
roting "me too" which would result in his not being able to contribute
anything to the court by his participation in the cause.4 3
"Contribution" to the case, then, is becoming somewhat of a rallying
point for the amicus, and this addition perhaps gives new life to the
historic concept of friendly assistance. The question is just how much
41 Comment, 55 Nw. U.L. RPv. 469, 482 (1960).
42 Krislov, supra note 4, at 712.
43 Keating v. Florida, 157 So. 2d 567, 569 (Fla. 196.3).
NOTES
freedom with respect to the issues of the litigants should the courts, in
their discretion, allow the amicus.44
V. CONCLUSION
Most courts on both the federal and state levels have recognized
the fact that amicus curiae participation, even when it serves two
masters, a client and the court, is a valuable tool in the judicial ma-
chinery of this country. It has been referred to as a form of "judicial
lobbying" that reflects a change in tactics and structure of interest
articulation in American politics. 45 Consequently, the state courts have
been in the vanguard of encouraging amicus participation. It is of
paramount importance that state and federal courts encourage most
legal arguments of the parties to be supplemented, even if the amicus
has "a weak legal argument, with a moral quality, forcefully pre-
sented by an 'outsider' [it] ... will not detract from the force of the
main argument... .f4 Since the strategies of the amicus are neces-
sarily different from those of the interested parties, greater amicus
participation cannot help but more thoroughly inform the court of all
the intricacies of a given case and even provide the court with ad-
ditional legal ammunition for opinions of great public interest.
George C. Piper
44 But cf. Keating v. Florida, supra note 43, at 569: "amicus is not at liberty
to inject new issues in a proceeding ...4 5 Krislov, supra note 4, at 705 (1963).46 VOSE, CAUCAS NS ONLy 166-67 (1959).
